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THROUGH THE GLOBAL LOOKING GLASS: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

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Through the Global Looking Glass: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Era of Globalization1

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The concept of globalization, while omnipresent in many circles, seems strangely absent from recent scholarly writings on Canadian foreign policy. On the one hand, globalization is a conditioning factor 'out there' that suggests the need to re-examine the foundations of the discipline. Andrew Cooper speaks of the fact that the "time is ripe for a fundamental re-examination of the nature of Canadian foreign policy" given, in part, the "accelerated processes of globalization."2 Notwithstanding the sweeping nature of international changes, Cooper reaffirms the importance of the traditional middle power framework to the study of Canadian foreign policy, although he argues that it can and should be complimented by some 'critical voices.' Kim Nossal, on the other hand, while acknowledging the profound changes that have confronted the international system over the past decade, suggests that "for those who make (and study) the foreign policy of a particular nation, the essence of their task has not changed much."3 Globalization may be 'out there,' but for these two preeminent scholars of Canadian foreign policy, at least to varying degrees, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

This paper argues that we need to take globalization seriously in the study of foreign policy, not simply as something 'out there' that may or may not have changed the opportunities and constraints under which policy is formulated or framed, but as a set of meanings which fundamentally alters our ability to conceive of foreign policy in the first instance, whether as analysts or as practioners. More specifically, the paper suggests that we need to understand the discursive construction of globalization; how it represents itself and shapes the terrain upon which foreign policy is framed, in order to

be able to assess the extent to which foreign policy has or has not changed in the face of global economic transformations. Such reflection is not merely a game of semantics; the way we understand globalization and what it might be profoundly affects our conception of the space for political action. More significantly, the way in which the discourse of globalization is articulated informs our conception of what is political in the first place, that is, it sets the boundaries for the terrain of foreign policy making by identifying what constitutes the 'legitimate' subject matter of politics and thus, of foreign policy.

With respect to Canadian foreign policy, then, what is most instructive is the way in which representations of globalization as a necessary and inevitable reality of the late twentieth century have exacerbated the existing tendency to de-politicize foreign economic policy (and economic policy more generally). Where it has always been useful for capitalists to claim an empirical distinction between the political and the economic, at no time is that distinction so much lived in practice and meaning as it is now. At the same time, however, the more the discourse surrounding globalization insists on its apolitical nature, the greater the likelyhood for political reaction by those 'outside' the 'legitimate' political terrain. The discourse surrounding globalization delimits what is legitimate politics (for example, limiting the state's capacity to intervene in the market), and makes alternative conceptualizations difficult to articulate, and even more difficult to understand. Yet, these are the stresses that confront Canadian foreign policy in an era of globalization; stresses born of increased social and political consensus on the one hand, and yet of growing social fissures on the other.

Defining globalization

In the attempt to take globalization seriously, some attention has to be paid to defining how globalization is understood, in itself, not an easy task. As Richard Barnet

and John Cavanagh have reminded us, "'[g]lobalization' is the most fashionable word of the 1990s, so portentous and wonderfully patient as to puzzle Alice in Wonderland and thrill the Red Queen because it means precisely whatever the user says it means."4 Globalization is evocative of universal and universalizing practices, intensifying 'global' interdependence, compressing space, accelerating time, and increasing the "conciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century."5 However defined, all peoples and states are said to be equally subject to its logics, which are on the whole beneficial and necessary, and societies have no choice but to 'adapt' to this new international economic conjuncture. Globalization becomes the concrete manifestation of newly liberalized 'market forces', increasingly unfettered by (undesirable) state regulation and control.6

"Globalization is a powerful force changing the fundamental relationship between markets and states."7 Like Daniel Drache and Meric Gertler, many scholars have concluded that at its most basic level, globalization is an economic process which finds its roots in the acceleration and transformation of changes which came into play in the 1960s. At this one level, globalization can be understood as a series of concrete practices or processes, and revolutions in technology, transportation and communications confer an inevitability to these transformations. James H. Mittelman argues that "[t]he chain of causality" providing the impetus for globalization "runs from the spatial reorganization of production to international trade and to the integration of financial markets."8 The notion of a chain of causality highlights the inevitability of this significant restructuring of the global capitalist economy under the rubric of 'globalization.'

In this reading, and of particular relevance to this paper, globalization is a series of universalizing economic processes. It implies a fundamental reorientation in the international investment strategies of transnational firms, facilitated in large part by

technological advances making possible the fragmentation of the production process. Under such a 'delocalized' model of the organization of production, the 'nationality' of a transnational corporation increasingly becomes a less salient point, for the advantages which may come to the 'home' country may be limited to a few jobs in the administrative head office. Through these new investment strategies, transnational spaces have been defined (which are less likely to coincide with national borders), and to the extent that delocalization has become a key motivation for international investment, these strategies have limited the capacity of any individual country to satisfy the investment requirements of transnational firms. Pressures are thereby created for the broadening of national markets, and for their more complete integration into larger (whether regional or international) trading blocs. Investment patterns in fact suggest the emergence of a 'triad' of investment concentration along the lines of regional 'blocs' -- North America, Europe, and Asia.9

While the internationalization of production is certainly not a new phenomenon in either political, business, or academic spheres, the extent to which is has become a widespread response of transnational firms has led to other manifestations of economic globalization. Most importantly, the globalization of production has led to the internationalization of service industries, a process which brings with it pressures to liberalize markets, as well as to incorporate services into new regional and international trading arrangements.10 The growth of service industries (running the gamut from banking to finance, to telecommunications, to entertainment, marketing, and education), and their strategic use by increasingly globalized transnational corporations marks one of the most significant features of the ongoing global economic restructuring. Nearly 70% of the U.S. GDP and three-quarters of its employment are in services, as is the case in most industrialized countries,11 and services are today responsible for 90 to 95% of the new jobs created in those countries. Estimates of the significance of trade

in services to current international commerce vary, accounting for between one-quarter and one-third of world trade. In the specific case of financial markets, globalization has been substantial and revolutionary, and has meant the wholesale 're-creation' of the international finance economy. No longer isolated from each other by time or distance, financial markets respond virtually instantaneously to fluctuations in markets half a world away. This market integration has both created and reinforced important pressures severely circumscribing the regulatory role of states in these industries.

Taken together, these aspects of globalization suggest that the key processes involved are primarily economic, although emergent trade and investment patterns are seen to create their own necessary pressures on the political organization of the world economy and the space available for state response. A further aspect of the internationalization of production and finance, therefore, is to be found in its widely perceived political and ideological consequences. Globalization brings with it the internationalization of the state, and the (globalized) diffusion of a neo-liberal ideology, which increasingly constrains parties of both the right and the left to adopt similar political agendas, although their rhetoric may differ. States appear to be relegated to playing a role facilitating the adaptation of the national economy to the new realities of emerging international economic structures,12 that is, to creating the policy environment both nationally and internationally favouring the globalization of production and service industries. Policy makers blame difficult political choices on their *lack* of choice, citing the foreclosure of options born of the pressures of globalization. Like the economic changes which apparently set the stage, the political and ideological consequences of globalization are seen to be homogeneous and totalizing, as likely to constrain states in the richest industrialized countries as in the developing world.

For François Chesnais, this focus on totalizing (largely economic) processes most closely approximates the meaning of the word globalization in its initial *ideological*

usage, which he credits to U.S. "business management schools" at Harvard, Columbia and Stanford. This usage of the term focuses on the 'global' and all encompassing nature of these economic, political and ideological processes, giving rise to the ancillary ideas of the borderless and stateless world, and bringing with it the characteristic of inevitable homogenization.13 For Chesnais, however, this use of the word 'globalization' occults or conceals the dialectical processes which are inherent to it; in particular, globalization inherently carries with it a 'double movement' or dialectic which runs contrary to the integration, convergence and homogenization it seems to imply. Put most succinctly, while globalization does contribute in some respects to the homogenization of the world -- through communications, technology, trade, investment, and the construction of political choices -- it also simultaneously heralds the end of the tendency of the modern era toward integration and convergence, and does so through the incorporation into globalization of an increased polarization of society, both globally and locally.14

Despite the global pretensions of globalization, no one can convincingly argue that these processes have been uniformly beneficial to marginalized regions of the world economy. The technological specialization which has facilitated global processes has resulted in a 'blurring' of distinctions between national economies, although perhaps not as much as the ideologues of globalization would like to pretend. As Robert Cox has pointed out, in an era of globalization, the concept of the 'third world' no longer has any clear meaning, "since many of the countries once considered as belonging to it have either found some niche as producers of manufactures, or natural resources (especially energy), or else have been relegated to a 'fourth world' sunken irretrievably in poverty."15 Chesnais points to the exclusionary impact of globalization, which has not favoured the development prospects of 'developing' countries, save for either those newly industrialized countries (NICs) which had reached a sufficient stage

of industrial and technological development by 1980 to allow them to keep pace with the significant political and economic changes of globalization, or those developing countries which have benefitted through accidents of geography from the triadic process of regionalisation in the 1980s and 1990s.16 Leblanc argues more strongly that current production models of globalization make it unlikely that the further marginalization of the least developed countries, those which have yet to share in the 'benefits' of economic globalization, can be avoided.17 My own work has suggested that this marginalization, far from being the exclusive product of economic and technological processes, is supported and reinforced by political choices.18 Whatever the specific cause, the purported benefits of globalization are certainly not felt globally, and any homogeneity which might result is not that suggested by globalization's apologists

Within national economies, the squeezing (out) of the middle class, both in terms of real income levels and way of life, is reflected in those same patterns of technological specialization. The restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s has brought with it the demise of full-employment capitalism, with its attendant impact upon real wage levels. Wages have experienced downward pressure in routine production services, in part because of the delocalization of production to low-wage economies and the concomitant assault on unions, and in secondary service industries (those providing in-person services), because formal education or job training are not valued as intrinsic to completion of the job task. The gap in real income levels and life style between these first two functional categories and that class of employees providing 'analytical' services, continues to grow, as the latter provide services whose value is not intrinsically linked to the amount of time spent at the job, but rather to the creativity of the task. The effects of this squeezing, of course, are felt disproportionately by the young (who compete for fewer jobs at generally lower pay), women (who make up the

bulk of the labour force performing in-person services), and older workers in mature industries.19

Seen in this way, globalization can be compared to a three-headed hydra; a series of material practices (relating, in the specific case of this paper, to the restructuring of the global economy, although such universalizing practices are not limited to the economic sphere), a political project adopted by key economic actors and some states,20 and an ideology which proposes globalization as the only, and necessary, alternative, however much the 'global reality' portrayed may not be experienced on the ground. Together, these three elements make up the discourse surrounding globalization; they become our constructed 'reality,' our view of what globalization *is*. Globalization as a series of material practices becomes indissociable from the meanings we ascribe to it, and it is precisely the meanings that we ascribe to these practices which create or foreclose opportunities for political action. In other words, globalization as a particular configuration of meaning is also globalization as physical or empirical practice, since the physical or empirical practice cannot be dissociated from the way it is interpreted. The very real understanding of globalization as a series of (technologically driven) economic practices, supported by powerful political actors, and defended by a pervasive ideological framework, defines a terrain upon which political action can, and cannot, take place. More particularly, because globalization sets itself up discursively as a process for which there are no alternatives and from which there is no escape, there can be no political choice but to conform to its exigencies. What is at its roots a profoundly political process (for the restructuring and extension of the market cannot take place in the absence of a regulatory framework, both domestic and international) becomes an apolitical 'reality'. We are either part of globalization, on the global bandwagon so to speak, or we are nowhere. We either become more competitive, efficient, leaner and meaner, or we are left to face some

void or chasm of unknown dimensions and perils.

Globalization and Canadian foreign policy

Within the discursive context giving meaning to globalization, it is unsurprising that Jean Chrétien first came to office in 1993 having made few explicit promises with respect to international trade or foreign economic policy. Beyond the vague promise to renegotiate aspects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Liberal Party's election platform *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada* (the Red Book) limited its commitments to assisting Canadian firms to become more aggressive traders: "More Canadian businesses *must* become exporters, and government *must* help them develop the knowledge and skills to make that possible."21 To that end, the Red Book committed the Liberal government to enhancing the ability of the Trade Commissioner Service of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to identify export and investment opportunities for Canadian firms.

The first indication that the climate for foreign economic policy making had changed since the highly politicized 1988 'free trade' election was foreshadowed in the 1993 election campaign. Despite earlier commitments to scrap NAFTA, the Liberal party had become less sanguine about the prospect of rejecting out of hand continental trade agreements, and Chrétien chose instead to campaign on the need to make changes to the Agreement. Doern and Tomlin argue that this was in part possible given that, contrary to the 1988 campaign, the intensity surrounding the issue of continental trade agreements had diminished. "NAFTA was presented as the 'FTA plus Mexico', simply a fine-tuning of the FTA. As a result, NAFTA generated less emotion... than did the FTA."22 Contrary to the FTA, which had been the subject of real political debate contrasting very different visions of Canada and its national destiny, NAFTA was presented as a 'technical' response to globalization and the extension of regional

markets, necessary to protecting Canada's access to the continental market.23

If regional trade agreements were no longer part of the terrain of the politicized (if highly political), the pursuit of regional or bilateral trade agreements became one of the strategies of the Canadian state within the context of globalization. As such, the Liberal government's newly-embraced free trade commitment was broadened to include not only the United States and Mexico, but virtually anyone who would listen. Trade diversification became one of the technical solutions to the exigencies of globalization, where possible, within the context of negotiated free trade agreements. These agreements have taken the form of the negotiation of NAFTA-like provisions with Chile, without the United States,24 as well as the expressed desire eventually to extend NAFTA "rules for free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere and even beyond."25 The Chrétien government's endorsement of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), announced at the December 1994 Americas Miami Summit, reflects another element of the commitment to freer trade. The FTAA, expected to be launched in 1998, is a process parallel to, and complimentary with, NAFTA and other regional free trade agreements throughout North and South America. Equally, the Liberal government has participated enthusiastically in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, actively promoting the initiative of Pacific Rim Free Trade by 2015. Free trade between North America and the European Union has been a favourite theme of Prime Minister Chrétien's, a plan derailed for a time by lukewarm support from Washington, and a "fish war" with Spain.26 Free trade with Israel came into effect on January 1, 1997, in part following upon an earlier deal negotiated between Israel and the United States,27 and free trade between Canada and the Palestinian Authority appeared a possibility by the summer of 1997.28

In contrast to the free trade election of 1988, however, political debate, and often, news coverage, is noticeably absent. It is as though the FTA fight having been

'lost' (or won, depending on which side of the fence you stand), the legitimate terrain of politics has been redefined. Trade agreements are economic arrangements made necessary by the restructuring exigencies of globalization, and the political and social impacts, if any, are incidental. Trade arrangements have moved from being on highly contested political terrain to being accepted (and often barely noticed) as an inevitable part of globalization, one other thing to be done on the road to eventual prosperity. It is simply not conceivable to imagine the political engagement around trade policy which was evident a decade ago -- the space for politics has been profoundly redefined.

Beyond the attempted negotiation and occasional conclusion of formal free trade agreements, the Liberal government has also embraced trade diversification through a series of 'Team Canada' initiatives. These voyages, travelling international road shows with the Prime Minister at the helm, and a supporting cast including Cabinet ministers, provincial premiers, municipal government officials, and business leaders, have targeted quickly growing regions of the world economy in search of trade and investment opportunities for Canadian firms. These high-profile delegations are considered necessary to give political importance to what are essentially business trips. As a senior official at the DFAIT argued: "We open the doors, and our business people walk through them. We can act as a catalyst and, if it comes down to competition between Canada and another country, that's where the political overlay can make the difference."29 Foreign economic policy became akin to an economic dating service, with state officials at all levels actively engaged in supporting the pairing up of firms and market opportunities, ever hopeful that the right 'match' will be made. What is most interesting about the 'Team Canada' initiative, however, is the extent to which it plays onto the depoliticized terrain surrounding the discourse around globalization.

Team Canada trade missions first began a year after the Liberal government came to office, and followed upon two smaller scale trade promotion visits by the Prime

Minister -- to Seattle for a meeting with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in mid-November 1993, and to Mexico in March 1994.30 These initiatives marked the first time in twenty years that a Canadian Prime Minister led a trade promotion mission, since Pierre Trudeau visited China. The first Team Canada tour in November 1994, grouping together the Prime Minister, nine provincial premiers (Québec's Jacques Parizeau refused to participate), Trade Minister Roy MacLaren, Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Raymond Chan and roughly 400 business leaders, went to the Far East to visit China, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Vietnam. In January 1995, a somewhat scaled-down version of Team Canada (roughly 200 business leaders) headed for Latin America, visiting Trinidad, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Costa Rica. In January 1996, the third Team Canada mission targeted South and Southeast Asia, touching down in India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. In January 1997, the apparently annual winter Team Canada pilgrimage took politicians and business leaders (including, for the first time, the Premier of Québec) on a whirlwind tour of the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. Finally, in January 1998, with participation interrupted (and cancelled in the case of Québec's Lucien Bouchard) due to Eastern Ontario and Québec's ice storm, Team Canada returned to Latin America. Each of these trade promotion tours has been greeted with great fanfare, and reports of millions if not billions of dollars in contracts, commercial agreements, and letters of understanding between Canadian businesses and international partners.31

Of the Team Canada missions, there is no doubt that the first trip to China was the most successful and attracted the greatest attention, both from the Canadian public and from Canadian business. That trade trip was characterized as a "$9-billion orgy of [contract] signings" and the participation of more premiers and twice as many firms as those in subsequent trade missions.32 In most respects, the huge economic payoffs reaped in China were obviously the result of months and years of work by individual

firms. In many cases, "[t]he actual deals ... [were] worked out and often signed well in advance of the trade mission, only to be signed again before the cameras."33 There remains a significant commitment to the principle of Team Canada, however, with the government insisting that companies would not be as willing to participate, if the missions did not generate concrete results, and further, that many business people expressed enthusiasm about the Team Canada format and prime ministerial participation.34 The relative success of Team Canada missions is equally demonstrated by the willingness of provinces to copy the lead of the federal government in planning their own international travels. An example of this was the 'Team Québec' voyage to South America featuring Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Bernard Landry and business officials representing 32 Québec companies.35

The Team Canada trade missions, however, are not the last word on the Team Canada concept. Rather, these very public trips abroad are the 'front-line' of the Red Book pledge to assist Canadian small and medium-sized businesses to operate in the international marketplace. In the government's analysis, export promotion is explicitly linked to job creation, which estimates that every $1-billion in exports can create as many as Canadian 12,000 jobs.36 Team Canada is very much the answer to the Liberal Party's election pledge of "jobs, jobs, jobs." Beyond international travels, Team Canada has become the code-word for an integrated, multi-department approach to international trade and business development, as announced by Roy MacLaren (also speaking on behalf of Industry Minister John Manley). This greater coordination between federal departments is in part driven by the period of budget cuts which have been the hallmark of the Chrétien government, forcing departments to work together to gain the best advantage from limited resources.

Led by DFAIT and involving sixteen federal departments and agencies, Canada's International Business Strategy (CIBS) "co-ordinates the efforts of all federal

departments and provincial governments involved in supporting the international business development pursuits of the private sector."37 Through direct consultation with the private sector, the CIBS defines strategies for a variety of sectors (22 in 1996-97) which involve government and industry assisting Canadian firms to "capture emerging global trade, technology and investment opportunities."38 National Sector Teams direct the development and implementation of sectoral strategies within the CIBS, and Regional Trade Networks coordinate the delivery of federal and provincial International Business Development programs at the local level, particularly with respect to export preparation for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).39 In addition, the International Business Opportunities Centre, jointly operated by DFAIT and Industry Canada, matches business leads provided by trade commissioners abroad with export capable Canadian firms, particularly SMEs.40

This paper is not arguing that the Team Canada initiatives are an inherently bad strategy, or even an inherently doubtful one. Rather, it is the non-politicized nature of Team Canada ventures which is so telling. 'Political' questions relate to whether or not particularly premiers should be participating; during this last foray, more for reasons of weather than the objectionable nature of the exercise. It is, in fact, instructive that Lucien Bouchard has dismissed his predecessor's boycott of Team Canada voyages, for this underlines the extent to which Team Canada is seen as an apolitical response to the exigencies of globalization. There is, in fact, no other way for the state to play the globalization 'game' once globalization becomes defined as an apolitical process. Industrial policy, for example, becomes anathema to the meaning which is attributed to globalization (competition, free market, liberalization, efficiency), and, of necessity, becomes increasingly associated with trade policy. As one Team Canada official pointed out, "...I would consider jobs and economic growth to be the chief domestic priority.... Far from getting away from that priority ... I would suggest that this [Team

Canada's trade mission to South and Southeast Asia] is really working on creating jobs and economic growth in Canada. So it's not getting away from domestic problems or priorities, it's actually helping solve problems and achieve our goals."41 If the state -- any state -- must be seen to be doing something (if only for reasons of political legitimacy), then globalization would seem to profoundly limit its options. Its choices are to be found in some combination of 'field of dream' politics (build it -- new infrastructure, for example -- and they -- foreign investors -- will come) and international cheerleading. Of course, Canada and its sub-national governments are not the only ones engaged in this type of activity; the discursive framing of globalization is widely understood and shared, and involves actions ranging from municipalities ('global cities') to regional organizations.

Conclusions: Contestation from the margins

What does the discourse surrounding globalization tell us in terms of Canadian foreign policy? If, as we have argued, discourse is as much material or empirical practice as the ideas and interpretations formed to give meaning to such practice, it is not as though the state can simply 'change its mind' and thus discover or create a new reality. In increasingly accepting globalization as an inevitable reality bringing with it its own exigencies, however, the discourse surrounding globalization profoundly alters the terrain of the political. A number of observations in this regard are most interesting.

At a conference on "How Canadians Connect" held at Queen's University in late February 1998, Frank Graves of EKOS Research presented survey results listing those elements or expressions of Canadian society with which they felt most affinity. Competitiveness, globalization, the minimalist state, efficiency, and the free market were squarely at the bottom of the list. Beyond the fact that these concepts hardly evoke stirring images of Canada, this analysis would suggest that they are also not

seen as particularly meaningful because they are not understood as a place for politics. Whatever the toll globalization may be imposing on Canadian citizens, resignation and disaffection is the answer. This is particularly unsurprising given the 'flattening out' of political debate on the economy, including trade policy -- all political parties have come to resemble each other, thus making the construction of the (non) choices quite clear.

This does not mean that the limited 'technical' role of the state in responding to the exigencies of globalization is wholly unquestioned. The number of non-governmental organizations assembled -- and protesting -- during the parallel APEC People's Summit in Vancouver in November 1997 was large by any measure. Posters dotting Union halls and University campuses protesting the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) are similarly indicative of the fact that the terrain on which the discourse surrounding globalization is articulated is not completely closed. Again, though, what is instructive here is the inability of political debate to take place; anecdotally evidenced in the Prime Minister's unfortunate jokes about the use of pepper spray against protesters on the one hand, and Sergio Marchi's apparently complete confusion over disagreements about the MAI on the other.42

In terms of Canadian foreign policy, however, what is clear is that for most analysts, and in most analyses, globalization has become an apolitical backdrop, a conditioning variable, a 'given'. This is, of course, consistent with the discourse surrounding globalization. In placing globalization as part of the world 'out there', rather than as a discourse which defines the very meaning of what is a legitimate subject for politics and therefore of foreign policy itself, these analyses are limited to the positing of globalization as some kind of *deus ex machina*, imposing limits but not of our own making, or to the observation that despite change, nothing much has changed (because globalization is not seen within the terrain of the political). What is not perceived is the displacement of the political -- to other areas, off to the side -- and the

fragmentary consequences that this has for Canadian society as a whole.43 Even if foreign policy is to be defined rather narrowly in terms of the actors who participate, as Kim Nossal has suggested, we are still left with a paradox in the matter of foreign economic policy under globalization. Foreign policy, connoting "the actions, goals, and decisions of athoritative political actions,"44 suggests that at some level at least, foreign policy is about the political, and is defined on a political terrain. A new understanding of foreign policy in the era of globalization would necessitate such an acknowledgement.